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ml ustralia and Argentina. On 
W \  Parallel Paths, by Tim Duncan 
J w  and John Fogarty, deserves a 
very careful read. If what follows here 
does not agree with all the authors 
say in their book, it should not deflect 
us  from an o p e n  and  d irec t  
confrontation with the major issue 
a n d  the  m any  su b s id ia ry  and  
provocative points they raise. Is 
Australia presently on an economic 
course  which will some day yield 
economic stagnation like that in 
Argentina? Some would argue that 
the question itself is invalid. The 
problem of establishing what should 
and what should not be compared 
makes comparative history a difficult 
ex e rc ise .  D u n can  and  F ogarty  
believe, however, that it is a 
rewarding approach, and that careful 
scholarship ana  com m onsense  can 
avoid serious errors. "When they 
work, comparisons can Drovide not 
only imaginative breakthroughs that 
pose new historical questions, but 
also a framework for the empirical 
investigation of those questions." (p. 
xii). I agree 
Fogarty and Duncan begin their 
comparison with an analysis of the 
development of very similar export 
econom ies  during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. In no 
uncertain terms, the authors point 
out how rapidly the Argentine 
econom y grew, how "successful” it 
was in generating wealth and how, by 
comparison. Australians had nothing 
to brag about. By adopting a
fundamentally laissez-faire policy, 
the Argentine government allowed an 
e f f i c i e n t  a n d  r a t io n a l  u s e  of 
resources which, in turn, yielded an 
impressive economic achievement 
supenor to that of Australia by 1914 
Things began to deteriorate in the 
1920s and 1930s although Argentina 
weathered the depression (1929-39) 
with far less suffering than did 
Australia. The causes  of Argentine 
difficulties are not to be found in 
economic policies but, instead, in the 
political culture which failed to 
reconcile conflicts over income 
distribution and which developed a 
strong case of nationalism bordering 
upon xenophobia.
T h e  c r i s i s  of c o n t e m p o r a r y  
A :g e n t in a  d e e p e n e d  w ith  th e  
simultaneous attempt to industrialise 
and to redistribute income under 
President Juan  Peron (1946-1955). 
W h e r e a s  A u s t r a l i a ' s  i n d u s t r y  
benefitfcd tremendously from World 
War II, Argentina, which remained 
neutral until vety near the end of the 
war. actually suffered for lack of 
spare  parts, capital equipment and 
adequate  investment. When after the 
war, Peron embarked on a program of 
d e v e lo p in g  heavy indu s try ,  he  
followed a policy of autarchy, 
s e v e r e l y  r e s t r i c t i n g  f o r e i g n  
investment, establishing high tariffs, 
diverting capital from the rural sector 
to the industrial sector, increasing 
the real wage of urban workers and 
nationalising many enterprises. In 
effect, Argentine industries grew 
oehind a wall of nationalism, their 
efficiency and competitiveness in a 
o o s t - w a r  w o r ld  of i n c r e a s i n g  
international trade being of little 
issue. It was the wrong way. And in 
the process, Peron nearly destroyed 
the export sector on which he 
depended for foreign exchange to 
pay for n e c e s s a r y  im p o r ts  of 
Industrial raw materials and capital
goods.
Peronist straiegy nad failed several 
years before the military, in coalition 
with  m an y  o t h e r  A rg e n t in e s ,  
overthrew him in 1955. But the post- 
Peronist regimes continued with the 
nationalist economic policies he had 
begun. The conflict over income 
shares, at the centre of Argentina’s 
difficulties since the 1940s (if not 
before), deepened  over the next two 
decades  to the point where, by 1975, 
Argentina faced civil war. In the 
m ean t im e ,  th e  A rg en t in es  lost 
opportunities to take advantage of 
the international economic boom of 
t h e  1 9 6 0 s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
irreconcilable conflicts. The second 
P e ro n  a d m in is t r a t io n  (1973-75) 
attempted to put Humpty Dumpty 
back together again and, like Whitlam 
in Australia, concentrated  on internal 
r e f o r m  w h i l e  i g n o r i n g  t h e  
in te rn a t io n a l  e n v iro n m e n t .  Both 
countries found themselves on a 
"slippery slide".
Obviously, Australia did not land in 
the sam e bucket that Argentina did. 
The latter, in its economic stagnation, 
becam e more inward looking while 
failing to resolve the basic struggle 
over who got what. Argentina simply 
did not develop political institutions 
capable of settling internal conflicts, 
like, for example, the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Commission. Neverthe­
less, Australia cannot rest easily 
because  its own economic future is 
threatened by stagnation. Australian 
industries are also over-protected, 
inefficient and unable to com pete  in 
the international markets.
What are the lessons to be drawn 
by the comparison? Duncan and 
F o g a r ty  a r g u e  t h a t  to  allow 
nationalism to isolate one 's  country 
from the international economy is to 
chart an extremely perilous course 
lead ing  to w a rd s  th e  rocks  of 
stagnation. Trading nations must not
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neglect their export industries; as  for 
manufacturing, both countries have 
neglected possible "comparative or 
even commercial advantages" while 
focusing upon other reasons for 
developing and maintaining their 
relatively weak bu t  p ro te c te d  
manufacturing sectors. These must 
be forced to make their way. How is 
this to be done? Obviously, Argentine 
politics is not the way. Indeed, 
" P o l i t i c a l  t o l e r a n c e ,  b e n i g n  
nationalism, a distrust of unfamiliarly 
grand principles, a remarkable talent 
for imposing formidable sectional 
checks .... have been as influential as 
A u s t r a l i a 's  f a n t a s t i c  r e s o u r c e  
e n d o w m e n t  in s u s t a i n i n g  th e  
population" (p. 170).
Should this summary of the a r g u m e n t  n o t  s t i m u l a t e  thoughts, then I urge you 
immediately to read the book. The 
thoughts it stimulated in me are those 
of a s tudent of Argentine history who 
c la im s  no  k n o w le d g e  of th e  
A u s t r a l i a n  p a s t  ( m u c h  l e s s  
"expertise"). The book has forced me 
to sharpen many ideas about the 
Argentine past, however, and, in the 
process, deepened my fascination 
with Australia.
As noted above, one of the 
difficulties with comparisons is that 
of establishing the param eters of 
comparability. Human behaviour, 
alas, puts great constraints on 
comparisons — and no. history aoes  
not repeat itself. Here is one of the 
problems: Argentina's European past 
begins more than 2 0 0  years before 
Australia's and a lot of institutional 
structures — social, economic and 
polftical — were already established 
when the ships landed at Sydney 
Cove. Precisely how those extra 
vears determined different structures 
in Argentina is very difficult to 
measure and not the point here. But I 
think I would have begun my story 
somewhat earlier than did Duncan 
and Fogarty. By the 1850s, in 
Argentina, a small and powerful 
group of landholders had firmly 
established themselves as a ruling 
class in alliance with wealthy 
merchants and a few lawyers, 
intellectuals and generals. The 
h e g e m o n y  e s t a b l i s h e d  by  th e  
landowners — their control of the 
state, their dominance of the working 
class, their possession of fantastic 
stretches of fertile land — was not 
effectively challenged until Peron 
came to pwoer in 1945.
It is true that this landholding.class
divided, with important political 
consequences, in the 185us, in the 
1890s, and in the  1930s, but the class 
never forgot that it held land, and a lot 
of it Moreover, although the landed 
oligarchy proved adaptable to the 
various commercial opportunities 
presented to it, and admitted new 
wealth from time to *ime, it never shed 
its seignorial attitudes and made only 
m inimal c o n c e s s io n s  to  so c ia l  
equality, a reasonable distribution of 
w e a l t h  a n d  b r o a d  p o l i t i c a l  
participation.
Thus, in the nineteenth century, the 
independent small agriculturalist in 
possession of his own land lost out on 
a fairly grand scale to the huge 
estancias (stations!. No land grant 
universities were established in 
Argentina, no proliferation of the  160 
square acre farm. The most common 
form of exploitation of the land was 
either tenant farming, sharecropping 
or wage labour. This is no t th e s tu iro f  
social equality. Nor did the various 
factions of the ruling class who 
controlled the government devote 
much of their effort or state revenues 
to the issue.
A long and sad tale can be told of 
the sins of omission and commissior 
the sanitary and housing conditions 
of the Buenos Aires working class 
were atrocious; welfare was limited to 
charity; when a labour movement 
organised to protect and advance the 
workers' interests, a  was met with 
s a v a g e  r e p r e s s i o n ;  d e c e n t  
educational and other government
services reached the rural areas  only 
haphazardly; even a moderately 
broad franchise was not achieved 
until 1912. Argentine history is 
littered with m om ents when these 
sins might have p e e r  atoned — in the 
1860s, 1890s, and 1916 to name but 
three. Perhaps the most tragic was 
that of 1916 when a government 
assum ed power with an overwhelm­
ing mandate to reform.
It soon lapsed into the distribution 
of patronage sustained by the 
rhetoric of reform until 1919 when it 
helped to precipitate a week of 
s l a u g h t e r  of th e  B u e n o s A i r e s  
working class. "The Tragic Week", as 
it becam e known, consum ed  perhaps 
8,000 Argentines and proved what 
was already fairly obvious — there 
would be very few concessions to 
dem ands fo ran  equitable distribution 
of income.
hat then, did the ruling class 
do with its accumulated 
capital? This is the crucial 
question in any further comparison 
between Australia and Argentina. As 
Duncan and Fogarty point out, 
Australian history contains none of 
the violence and political instability 
that is so evident in the Argentine 
past. Why? While they explore the 
differences in political culture, I 
would concentrate  on the formation 
of class 3 p rocess which goes deep 
in to  t h e  h i s t o r i e s  o f  b o t h  
communities. Such a study would 
yield. I suspect, a portrait of an upper 
class in Argentina which not onlv 
conceded  nothing (or very little) to 
reform and eauitv. but also withdrew 
much of its profits and refused to 
reinvest them.
Without adequa te  data, one can 
only guess  where the profits went, 
in to  c o n s p i c u o u s  c o n s u m p t io n ,  
speculative ventures, or perhaps 
overseas banks. But, obviously, they 
did not end up as  state revenues to be 
used to redress the economic 
in e q u a l i t ie s  no t  only  b e tw een  
workers and employers, but also 
between regions.
Consequently, it was left to Peron 
between 1945 and 1955 to organise 
the labour movement fand to capture 
it); to tell the workers for the first time 
in Argentine history that the state had 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  t h e m ;  to  
redistribute wealth; and to attempt
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a c c o m p a n y in g  c o n s t r u c t io n s  of 
masculinity and femininity are deeply 
embedded in the process or capital 
accumulation, but also in the 
legitimation of capitalism as an 
economic ana social form."
The family domestic labour, 
psychoanalysis, education and the 
functions of the state are d iscussed in 
order to broaden the framework for 
looking at subordination.
( L.\HI m KTHN 
__________ _
Burton suggests  that we must 
move beyond the feminist theory that 
has been uncritical in assuming "that 
the male necessarily benefits from 
the family institution".
"The link between family and work 
must be explored," she states, "using 
research methods which assume a 
complex, even contradictory and 
ambiva'ent response to the social 
world.” Some of this, at least, has 
been done since Subordination was 
conceived in the debate  in the United 
States around "Bringing it all back 
home" (See ALR, No. 80.1982) and in 
Barrett and McIntosh's The Anti- 
Social Family.
■ n discussing the state, Burton
■ suggests that we must look
■ beyond policies and strategies 
that are directly related to women 
because women’s interests are often 
bound up with more general policies
and legal processes. The state is seen 
as a social process which is, to some 
extent, shaped by struggle and 
dem ands which require a broader 
feminist input
The undoubted additional power 
enjoyed by some middle class 
women is referred to, and feminist 
struggles, it is suggested, do not 
necessarily represent the interests of 
working class women.
This is, in my view, a controversial 
way of attempting to discuss the class 
differences among women (even to 
attempt to establish what is middle 
c lass and what working class is not 
easy). But io pose the problem in the 
way suggested  above may obscure 
ratner than clarify.
It is difficult to know which of the 
fe m in is t  s t r u g g l e s  d id /d o  no t 
necessarily represent the interests of 
working class women — opposition 
to rape, for women's refuges and 
health centres, for fertility control 
and abortion, the development of 
public aw areness  of incest, for child 
care or equal pay, improvements in 
the legal and social rights of lesbians, 
for the right to work and in all 
occupations?
It could well be argued that some of 
these, or others, did not represent the 
immediate priorities of working class 
women and that women benefited 
from achievements in an unequal 
way.
For example, there are some 
(probably a small minority of) 
tertiary-educated women who have 
accrued additional advantages from 
the feminist movement — jobs in high 
places, relatively well-paid positions 
in and out of the bureaucracy, greater 
access  to the results of affirmative 
action programs, etc. For women 
who are black or migrant, the gaps 
are even wider.
But feminism has also had some 
awareness of those aitferences which 
arise from that amalgam of sex class 
and race, the exact nature of which 
Keeps eluding us. There have also 
been occasions on which the 
interests of middle class women have 
oeen rejected by feminist campaigns, 
for example, wnen the child care 
movement opted for a demand for 
greater federal finance and more 
complex forms of child care rather 
than for tax deductiorft which benefit 
the more advantaged women.
The final sections of Burton's book 
take up a range of necessary 
priorities for feminists to pursue, 
including the importance of various 
forms of social legislation and the 
need to attack the sexual division of 
labour through the  involvement of 
men in child nurturing
"It is not childbearing," Burton 
concludes, "physical weakness, or 
any other presumed biologically 
determined differences that are the 
basis of women's subordination 
within capitalist societies. It is the 
social allocation to women of 
responsibilities for children. The 
o b s t a c l e s  to  c h a n g i n g  t h i s  
connection lie within the capitalist 
system of production, the vicious 
circle of sex-segregated work and the 
d ivision of lab o u r  within th e  
household."
Subordination is a useful addition 
to the debates engaging socialist 
feminists. The complexity of the 
issues confronting us are duly 
acknowledged and it will help to fuel, 
in a constructive way, the ongoing 
debate.
Jayce Stevens is an activist and writer 
in the women's movement and Is a 
member of the CPA national executive.
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community development m rural 
a r e a s .  P e ro n ,  th e n ,  m u s t  be 
understood as a response to the 
social conflict in Argentina and not 
exclusively as  the outcome of a 
nationalistic desire for economic 
independence.
One of the lessons I learned 
from reading this boon is that 
A u s t r a l i a n s  m u s t  c o n t i n u e  to 
confront and manage the proDlems of 
equity and distribution with as much 
ingenuity as they have those  of 
production. Failure to do so will 
render even stronger economic 
growth useless to prevent social 
conflict.
James Levy teaches Latin American 
history, with a specialisation in 
argentina, in the School of Spanish & 
Latin American Studies at UNSW.
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